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Use of Closed Circuit Television
by Patricia A. Cleaveland

lthough child sexual abuse occurs
frequently, such cases are difficult
to prosecute. The child is usually
the only witness to the crime. Corroborating physical evidence, if any, may be inconclusive. 1 Children are often found incompetent to testify. Ifa child does testify,
he or she may be easily confused by crossexamination and unable to recall crucial
details or relate them to the jury. Currently, there are three types of statutes
aimed at reducing the burden that the judicial system places on the child witness.
Child hearsay statutes and videotape statutes have been most prominent. The third

A
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type, testimony via closed circuit television,
has recently been enacted by the Maryland
legislature in an effort to strengthen the
prosecution's case in child abuse actions
while protecting the child victim from further trauma.
This article will evaluate the Maryland
closed circuit television statute by concentrating on the confrontation clause and
other constitutional guarantees that may
be offended. Because of its recent passage,
the Maryland statute's constitutionality has
not yet been tested. Since there are no similar statutes, 2 it is necessary to analogize it
to the child hearsay and videotape statutes.

Part I of this article describes the difficulties faced in prosecuting a child abuse case.
Part II discusses the hearsay rule which
limits the admission of out-of-court statements. Parts III and IV consider child
hearsay and videotape statutes as well as
the decisions of state courts with respect to
such statutes. Part V discusses the Maryland closed circuit television statute and
current case law concerning closed circuit
testimony. Part VI addresses the Maryland
statute and other constitutional guarantees. In part VII the writer concludes that
the Maryland statute is constitutional.

for Victims of Child Abuse
I. The Child Witness in
Sexual Abuse Cases
Children are reluctant witnesses. 3 A
child may retract a true report of sexual
abuse due to guilt, fear of reprisal or anxiety
that the offender will be sent to prison. 4
Child abusers often threaten their child
victims with violence if the children report
the abuse. Consequently, a child victim
may be so frightened by the alleged abuser's
presence in the courtroom that the child is
unable to testify rationally. Parents sometimes decline to press charges rather than
subject their abused children to the ordeal
of extended litigation requiring repetition
of a painful and best-forgotten episode. 5
When a child testifies at the trial of his
accused assailant, he is treated the same
way as an adult witness. 6 Child victims are
required to testify in the same courts and
in the same manner as adults. A courtroom
physically accommodates adults, but not
younger children, which makes the room
especially threatening to them. "No special judges are appointed to hear child victims; the court's formal procedures make
no allowances for their protection, and no
expert in problems of children's mental
hygiene is appointed by the state to support child victims." 7 These procedures
contrast sharply with those used in the
case of juvenile offenders who are insulated and kept separate from the system
that processes adult offenders.
The child abuse victim who is required
to testify in court may experience severe
psychological stress. The trauma of reliving the past experience can be very damaging to the child. Some commentators have
suggested that legal intervention in response to child sexual abuse often constitutes a second victimization of the child. 8
The judicial system has not been sensitive
to the victimization that a child may face in
the courtroom. 9 Consequently, legislators
have passed legislation aimed at reducing
the trauma to a child witness.

II. Hearsay and the
Confrontation Clause
Child hearsay statutes create a special
exception to the hearsay rule for statements made by child victims of abuse,

enabling a third person to repeat in court
the child's description of the abusive act.
Videotape statutes allow the child's testimony to be preserved on videotape for
presentation to the jury at trial. Maryland's
closed circuit television statute allows the
child to testify outside the courtroom and
the physical presence of the defendant by
means of closed circuit television. These
statutes deprive defendants of the opportunity to confront their accusers face-toface before a jury. Arguably, the statutes
violate the sixth amendment's guarantee
that" [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witness against him." 10
This federal right is binding on the states. I I
Child hearsay, videotape, and technically, closed circuit television statutes
permit the admission at trial of hearsay
evidence. Hearsay evidence is defined as
out-of-court statements offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. 12 The hearsay
rule is related to but not identical to the
confrontation right. Originally,
[t]he primary object of the [confrontatIon clause of the sixth amendment]
... was to prevent depositions or ex
parte affidavits ... being used against
the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness in which the accused has an
opportunity, not only of testing the
recollection and sifting the conscience
of the witness, but of compelling him
to stand face to face with the jury in
order that they may look at him, and
judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which he gives his
testimony, whether he is worthy of
belief. 13
The belief is that face-to-face confrontation at trial enhances the truth seeking process. Generally, witnesses must be present
at trial where the defendant is allowed to
cross-examine them. 14 The jury may thus
observe the demeanor of witnesses while
under oath and subject to cross-examination by the defense. 15 As outlined by the
Supreme Court,
confrontation (1) insures that the witness will give his statement under oath

- thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding
against the lie by the possibility of a
penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination,
the 'greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth' ; and (3) permits the jury that is to decide defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of
the witness in making his statement,
thus aiding the jury in assessing his
credibility. 16
Hearsay statements are found inadmissible because they lack this test of reliability.17 If literally applied, the sixth amendment's confrontation clause would bar the
admission of all hearsay evidence unless the
out-of-court declarant testified at trial. I8
Bu.t courts have never interpreted the confrontation clause to exclude all out-of-court
statements. 19 In Mattox v. United States 20
the Supreme Court ruled that the general
prohibition of hearsay evidence "must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and the necessities of the
case." 21 The Court continued by stating
that "the rights of the public shall not be
wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the
accused." 22
As the Supreme Court has noted, "[a]
number of exceptions have developed over
the years to allow admission of hearsay
statements made under circumstances that
tend to assure reliability and thereby compensate for the absence of the oath and
opportunity for cross-examination." 23 An
example is the exception for dying declarations. 24 This exception is based on the
belief that a person facing imminent death
is prone to speak the truth. 25
The Supreme Court has found out-ofcourt statements admissible when the declarant testifies at trial based on the reasoning that the opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant about the out-of-court statement sufficiently tests its reliability.26 If
the declarant does not testify, and therefore is not present for cross-examination at
trial, out-of-court statements are admissible only if they meet the requirements established by Ohio v. Roberts. 27 The first
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requirement is that the state must show
that the declarant is "unavailable." 28 Secondly, the statement is admissible only ifit
bears adequate "indicia of reliability." 29
Reliability can be demonstrated by showing either that the evidence falls within a
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception 30 or that
it bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 31
The unavailability requirement reconciles two competing interests. The
defendant has the right to confront the
declarant.32 On the other hand, when confrontation is not possible, the prosecution
should be able to present hearsay evidence
representing competent testimony rather
than no evidence at all. 33 By demonstrating unavailability the state justifies frustrating the defendant's interest in confronting and cross-examining the witness.
In child sex abuse cases, certain "firmly
rooted" hearsay exceptions have been used
to admit out-of-court statements made by
the child victim. Most widely used has
been the "excited utterance" 34 which allows the admission of statements made by
the child while under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event or condition. Also used have been "statements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment." 35 The result, however, has
been that many courts strain the rationales
of these exceptions by extending the allowable time lapse, and have admitted statements made several hours or even days
after the event. 36
If a child is found ''unavailable'' to testify,
other possible traditional hearsay exceptions that have been used include "statements made under belief of impending
death" 37 and "former testimony." 38 The
latter exception is the rationale behind
videotape statutes which permit depositions of child victims to be presented to the
jury at trial. Although these exceptions
have been useful in admitting some statements of child victims, most statements
are still excluded.

III. Child Hearsay Statutes
Eight states 39 have enacted hearsay statutes creating a special exception to the
hearsay rule for statements made by child
victims of sex abuse. This exception enables the person to whom the child spoke,
for example, the child's mother or doctor,
"to repeat in court the child's description
of the abusive act."40 There are three rationales generally offered in support of a
hearsay exception for child reports of sexual abuse. 41 The first is necessity. Necessity is based on the belief that a child is unable to testify about such sensitive matters
and traditional hearsay exceptions do not
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allow the child's out-of-court statements to
be admitted. The second finds the child's
hearsay testimony to be inherently reliable. A child's out-of-court statements may
be more reliable than his actual in-court
testimony since a child's ability to relate
events under the pressure of cross-examination may be limited. 42 The third reason
is that child victims need to be protected
from the trauma resulting from courtroom
testimony. 43
Washington and Kansas were the first
two states to pass child hearsay statutes. 44
The Washington statute applied to a child
victim under ten years of age. 45 In order to
find "sufficient indicia of reliability" the
court must consider the time, content and
circumstances of the child's statement. If
the child is unavailable as a witness, corroborative evidence of the act must be established. 46 The Kansas statute,47 on the
other hand, requires that the court find
that the child victim is unavailable as a
witness, that the statement is "apparently
reliable" and the child was not induced to
make the statement falsely by use of threats
or promises. 48
Most of the child hearsay statutes adopt
the standards of unavailability of the child
victim as a witness and adequate "indicia
of reliability" of the statement set forth in
Ohio v. Roberts for resolving confrontation
clause challenges to the hearsay rule. 49
Five of the statutes 50 direct that the court
should admit hearsay statements only ifit
finds that the statement is supported by
sufficient indicia of reliability. All five
statutes also require that the child testify at
trial or be found unavailable as a witness.
If the child is not available to testify, most
of the statutes require corroboration of the
abusive act.51 The Illinois statute allows
testimony by the child that he or she complained of such act to another as well as
testimony by the person to whom the child
complained that such complaint was made
in order to corroborate the child's testimony.52
Currently under consideration by the
Governor's Task Force in Maryland is the
Child Advocacy Model Statute prepared
by the ABA Resource Center. 53 This statute involves a proposed hearsay exception
for a child's statement of sexual abuse. In
the proposal, if the court finds that specific
requirements are satisfied, an out-of-court
statement made by a child under the age of
eleven years is admissible into evidence in
any judicial proceeding. The statement
may be admitted if the child testifies at
trial, including testimony by closed circuit
television, or if the child is found unavailable. The proposed statute specifically
states what constitutes unavailability. Unavailability includes:

death; absence from the jurisdiction;
total failure of memory; persistent refusal to testify despite court orders to
do so; physical or mental disability;
privilege; incompetency at trial (including inability to communicate at
all about the offense due to extreme
fear or other similar reason); or substantiallikelihood of severe emotional
trauma from testifying in open court
and in the physical presence of the defendant, jury and public, or trauma
from testifying by any other means
including videotaped deposition or
closed-circuit television. 54
Another requirement in the proposal, is
that the statement must possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The
proposal outlines thirteen factors the court
may consider in making such a determination. For example, the declarant's personal knowledge of the event; certainty
that the statement was made, including the
credibility of the person testifying about
the statement; any apparent motive to lie
or partiality by the declarant, including interest, bias, corruption, coercion; whether
more than one person heard the statement,
etc. Finally, notice must be given to the defendant prior to trial of the prosecution's
intention to introduce the statement.
Child hearsay statutes do not violate the
confrontation clause as long as the child
victim is available to testify and be crossexamined at trial. Frequently, however,
the court finds that the child is unavailable
to testify because of the child's incompetence 55 or medical unavailability. 56 Consequently, the defendant is denied the opportunity for cross-examination. One legal
commentator has stated that a finding of
unavailability of a child victim as a witness
is not warranted based on the likelihood of
emotional trauma nor the incompetency of
the child since neither makes it impossible
for the child to testify in courtY On the
other hand, if a child is so frightened or
inarticulate to allow any meaningful examination, a finding of unavailability is justified since the effect is that relevant testimony is not elicited. In such circumstances,
the child's hearsay statement should be admitted if properly corroborated.
The lack of corroboration of the abusive
act is a frequent difficulty found in child
abuse cases. The question is, therefore,
what constitutes sufficient corroboration
so that a child's statement may be admitted.
The Washington Supreme Court has held
that adequate indicia of reliability of a
statement made by a child victim of sexual
abuse must be found in circumstances surrounding the making of the out-of-court
statement and not from subsequent cor-

roboration of the criminal act. 58 The Washington Court of Appeals held that the fact
that the statute requires "corroborative
evidence of the act" does not fulfill the
high standard of reliability necessary to
use the child hearsay exception, since corroboration of sexual abuse alone does
not lend particular trustworthiness to the
child's statement regarding the identity of
the abuser. 59

IV. Videotape Statutes
The second method for admitting a
child's statement of sexual abuse into evidence is by videotape. Thirteen states have
enacted videotape statutes 60 which allow
the child's testimony to be taken prior to
trial in the presence of a judge, the defendant, and both attorneys and preserved on
videotape for presentation to the jury at
trial. The purpose of these statutes is to
spare the child repeated appearances in
court and permit the child to withdraw
quickly from the judicial process. 61 These
statutes usually permit cross-examination62
since most involve the videotaping of depositions 63 or preliminary hearings. 64
In states that allow videotaped testimony
to be used in lieu of the child's testimony at
trial, the statutes require that the defendant be present and that cross-examination
be allowed during the videotape. 65 All of
these statutes except Arkansas and New
Mexic0 66 require that the court find the
child unavailable to testify at trial before
the videotape is admissible. Four other
statutes 67 require that the child victim be
available to testify at trial before the videotape is admissible but allow the testimony
to be taken outside the presence of both
prosecution and defense attorneys. These
statutes require, however, that the person
conducting the interview must be present
at the trial and be available to testify or be
cross-examined by either party. The Wisconsin statute 68 allows the videotape to be
used in lieu of or in addition to the direct
testimony of the child at trial.
Once the videotaped testimony is found
to be admissible, it is treated as the "functional equivalent of testimony in court." 69
Videotaped testimony offered later is hearsay, and the Supreme Court has held that
prior testimony can be admitted o.nly under the same constraints as other hearsay
evidence. 7o Therefore, under the requirements of Roberts, videotaped testimony
would be admissible only if the child testified at trial about the testimony or the state
demonstrated that the child was unavailable.
The Supreme Court has treated past
testimony as ordinary hearsay in two instances. First, where the defendant had no

adequate opportunity for cross-examination
at the earlier hearing,71 and second, where
the defendant failed to conduct vigorous
cross-examination and had no way of knowing that the witness would not testify at
trial. 72 On the other hand, most videotape
statutes allow full opportunity for crossexamination when the testimony is recorded, and the defendant is on notice that
the videotaped testimony may be used in
lieu of the child's testimony at trial. At the
time the testimony is taken, these statutes
preserve the essential elements of confrontation - the oath, the opportunity to observe the witness, demeanor of the witness, and the right to cross-examine. 73
These elements provide "all that the sixth
amendment demands: 'substantial compliance with the purpose behind the confrontation requirement'." 74

The child abuse
victim who is
required to testify in
court may experience
severe psychological
stress.

Arguably, the requirement of direct
physical confrontation is the least important element of the confrontation clause.
At the time the Constitution was drafted,
live testimony was the only way that a jury
could observe the demeanor of a witness. 75
This element may have been the result
of the inability to foresee technological
developments that would permit crossexamination and confrontation without
physical presence. The Supreme Court
has held that "a primary interest secured
by [the confrontation clause] is the right of
cross-examination; an adequate opportunity for cross-examination may satisfy the
clause in the absence of physical confrontation."76
Most courts have admitted videotape

testimony as evidence even though there
was no direct physical confrontation at
trial. In State v. Melendez 77 the Arizona
Court of Appeals upheld the use at trial of
a videotaped deposition of a six-year-old
sexual abuse victim, noting that the defendant and his counsel were present during
the videotaping and had the right to crossexamine the witness. 78 Evidence was presented that the witness, as a result offear,
would become uncommunicative if called
to testify before a jury. In holding that no
prejudice resulted to the defendant, the
court stated that "the circumstances justified the trial court's invocation of modern
technology to meet the special needs of a
witness and to afford the defendant his
constitutional right to confrontation." 79 A
Florida court acknowledged the need to exclude the defendant from a deposition because of emotional trauma to his child victim. 80 In Commonwealth v. Stasko 81 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania approved
the constitutionality of videotapes, stating
that the three purposes of the right of confrontation (oath, cross-examination, and
demeanor) are well served by the videotaped deposition.
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals had no objection to the trial
court allowing videotaped testimony of
children at trial. 82 In order to relieve their
apprehensiveness about appearing in court,
the trial judge and the parties agreed to
substitute the children's videotape testimony for their live testimony. During deliberations, the jury requested permission
to replay in the jury room the videotaped
testimony of the children. The Ninth Circuit found an abuse of discretion in replaying the videotape stating that videotape
testimony serves as the functional equivalent of a live witness. 83
Videotapes may not faithfully convey
the witness' demeanor, however, and may
impede the jury's determination of credibility. Addressing objections made by the
defendant in a murder case, the California
Court of Appeals "concede[d] that testimony through a television set differs from
live testimony, [but] the process does not
significantly affect the flow of information
to the jury. Videotape is sufficiently similar to live testimony to permit the jury to
properly perform its function." 84 It found
that videotape was no less valid or less reliable than the reading of a written transcript and stated that fair new procedures
that facilitate proper fact finding are allowable. 85 Therefore, generally, videotape
testimony is admissible when the defendant is given an opportunity to crossexamine the witness and when the court
finds that the child is unavailable to testify
at trial.
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v. Section 9·102 and the
Confrontation Clause
The Maryland legislature has attempted
to reduce the psychological harm to a child
victim testifying in a child abuse case
through the passage in 1985 of Section
9-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Annotated
Code. 86 The statute allows a judge, under
certain circumstances, to order the child's
testimony to be taken outside both the
courtroom and the physical presence of the
defendant and shown live by means of
closed circuit television. Before a child
may testify in this fashion, the judge must
first determine that testimony by the child
victim in the courtroom will result in the
child suffering such serious emotional distress that the child could not reasonably
communicate. 87
While the child is testifying by closed
circuit television, only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant and
the judge may question the child. 88 The
prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the
defendant, the operators of the closed circuit television equipment and any person
whose presence, in the opinion of the
court, contributes to the well-being of the
child may be in the room with the child
when he testifies. 89 During the child's testimony, the judge and the defendant shall
be in the courtroom. 90 Closed circuit television may not be used if the defendant is
representing himself pro se. 91
Section 9-lO2 is aimed at easing the
trauma of a child witness by allowing
the child's testimony to be taken outside
the presence of the defendant. Also, it is
carefully drafted to protect the rights of
the defendant. A judge may order the testimony of a child victim to be taken outside the courtroom and simultaneously
shown in the courtroom by means of a
closed circuit television only if he determines that testimony by the child victim in
the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that
the child cannot reasonably communicate.
Essentially, the child becomes an unavailable witness. The defense attorney is permitted in the room with the child when the
child testifies assuring a full opportunity
for cross-examination. During cross-examination the defendant is able to consult
with the defense attorney by an appropriate electronic method.
Because of the absence of the witness
from the courtroom, closed circuit testimony, as in videotape, may implicate the
defendant's right to confrontation of witnesses. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Benfield,92
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tion of a traumatized adult kidnap victim
at trial violated the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. The court
held that the right of confrontation normally includes a face-to-face meeting at
trial at which time cross-examination takes
place. 93
In Benfield, the victim developed a psychiatric infirmity following the ordeal and
her treating psychiatrist indicated that she
could not be subpoenaed for trial for several
months. 94 The trial court granted the government's request for a videotaped deposition and ordered that the defendant could
be present at the deposition, but not within
the vision of the victim. During the deposition, the defendant sat in another room
and observed the proceedings on a monitor.
He was allowed to stop the questioning by
sounding a buzzer in order to consult with
counsel. Counsel was allowed to conduct
cross-examination. 95
The court stated that "a videotaped deposition supplies an environment substantially comparable to a trial; but where the
defendant was not permitted to be an active
participant in the video deposition, this
procedural substitute is constitutionally
infirm." 96 Recollection, veracity and communication are influenced by a face-to-face
challenge. The court went on to hold that,
if narrow in scope, an exception to the
face-to-face requirement could be based on
necessity or waiver.97
Although the holding was rendered in
the context of a conviction of violation of a
municipal ordinance, a proceeding civil in
nature, the court in Kansas City v. McCoy98
held that the confrontation clause did not
demand the physical presence of the witness in the courtroom. In McCoy, the defendant was convicted of a city ordinance
prohibiting possession of marijuana. The
court held that the confrontation clause did
not require that an expert witness giving
testimony against the defendant be physically present in the courtroom, and that
the use of a closed circuit television system
by which the witness and persons in the
courtroom were visible and able to hear
each other, was sufficient. 99 The court
based its decision on precedent which established that the requirement of the physical presence of the witness in the courtroom
must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of
the case, 100 and that an adequate opportunity for cross-examination may satisfy the
confrontation clause even in the absence of
physical confrontation. 101
A New Jersey superior court held in
State v. Sheppard 102 that the use of videotape l03 testimony of a ten-year-old abuse
victim would be permitted, and in an ex-

tended analysis, found that the defendant's
right of confrontation would not be violated. The court distinguished Benfield on
several grounds. It stated that Benfield involved a deposition in which the jury was
not present to see and hear the actual testimony whereas, here, the jury would watch,
by means of a monitor in the courtroom,
the ten-year-old as she testified. In Benfield
the victim was an adult and not a child.
Additionally, the defendant in Benfield
was not charged with sexual abuse. These
factors convinced the court that the competing interests involved warranted dispensing with confrontation. Since there
was no curtailment of the right of crossexamination (the central purpose of confrontation), the procedure was upheld. 104
The fact that closed circuit testimony is
a live process may enable it to avoid entirely
some of the challenges leveled against videotaped testimony. 105 Closed circuit testimony is instantaneous so it permits spontaneous examination and cross-examination
of a witness in the presence of the trier of
fact. It cannot be edited, as a videotape can,
and, therefore, offers less likelihood of distortion as regards both the testimony and
the demeanor, and hence the credibility of
the witness. 106
Testimony offered pursuant to Maryland's closed circuit television statute is
more reliable than the traditional hearsay
statement introduced into evidence by a
third person's testimony. Under Section
9-102, the facts are stated directly by the
child and are not biased by the views of the
individual relating the child's statement in
court. In addition, sixth amendment goals
are satisfied by cross-examination and the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witness, without direct confrontation.
This statute allows the witness to avoid the
trauma of courtroom interrogation as well
as the trauma of confrontation with the
defendant.
Section 9-lO2 has not yet been tested by
the courts. The primary challenge it must
pass is the confrontation clause. This statute should pass such a challenge. The protection of the confrontation clause is not
absolute. As the Supreme Court held in
Mattox, "[a] technical adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision may occasionally be carried farther than is necessary
to the just protection of the accused, and
farther than the safety of the public will
warrant." 107 Competing interests may
warrant dispensing with confrontation at
trial.I° 8
This statute advances such competing
interests. It attempts to remedy the difficulties encountered in prosecuting crimes
in which the only witness is a young child

sometimes so frightened and traumatized
as to be unable to communicate. Second, it
protects young victims from the prolonged
ordeal of recounting the abusive acts in
open court. The state holds an interest in
protecting young children, alleged victims
of abuse, from the trauma of repeated appearances and extended testimony in open
court in the presence of the alleged assailant. Closed circuit testimony does not significantly infringe upon the defendant's
confrontation rights. As long as the defendant can observe the child's testimony and
can confer with his attorney during crossexamination, the essential safeguards of
confrontation are preserved.
An argument offered in opposition to
the statutes that permit child victims to
testify outside the presence of a defendant
is that of "where will the line be drawn?"
Arguably, the same interests are involved
in cases of adult victims of rape, crimes
against elderly persons, "mob" cases or in
any such cases in which the victims are severely frightened and may suffer further
trauma in testifying against their alleged
assailant. The state should give more protection to these victims. The response to
this argument is that the state has a greater
interest in protecting a child victim. A child
is more vulnerable than an adult. A child
has not developed the mechanisms an adult
has to enable him to cope with the stress
and pressures involved in prolonged prosecutions. Therefore, greater protection of
the child victim is justified.
Prejudice to the defendant is another objection made concerning this type of testimony. Such testimony may create the impression that it is "special." This objection,
however, should be dealt with on a case-bycase basis. A judge may, in his discretion,
refuse to admit evidence that is purely
prejudicial. 109
Although hearsay, closed circuit testimony would still satisfy the guidelines
established by Roberts. Before a child may
testify in this manner the court must, in
effect, determine that the child is unavailable. Reliability may be tested by the jury
through the observance of the child's demeanor while subject to cross-examination.
Under these circumstances, it is clear that
closed circuit testimony sufficiently safeguards a defendant's confrontation rights
so as to prevail under such an attack.
Because the Maryland statute narrowly
limits the circumstances in which closed
circuit testimony may be used and preserves
the critical elements of the trial setting, the
constitutional rights of the defendant are
preserved. At the same time, victims of
child abuse are protected from further psychological harm associated with testifying
in open court.

VI. Section 9·102 and other
Constitutional Guarantees
Closed circuit testimony may offend other
clauses of the United States Constitution
including the public trial and compulsory
process clauses of the sixth amendment, 11 0
the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment,111 and the freedom of the
press clause of the first amendment. 112
The compulsory process clause guarantees
the defendant a "right to put on the stand a
witness who is physically and mentally capable oftestifying to events that he personally observed, and whose testimony would
have been relevant and material to the defense." 113 Thus, defendants have a right to
call available and competent witnesses on
material and relevant issues. However, this
right is not absolute. This guarantee is not
offended when the witness is unavailable
including when the witness refuses to testify.114 A finding of unavailability is required before the closed circuit television
is put into operation.

Most courts have
admitted videotape
testimony as evidence
even though there was
no direct physical
confrontation at trial.

Under the sixth amendment the defendant has a right to a public trial,115 and
under the first amendment the public and
press have a right of access to criminal
trials. 116 Special procedures which protect
the child witness by limiting access to the
courtroom may affect these rights. Under
the Maryland statute, only access to the
room where the child is testifying is limited.
The courtroom would still be open to the
press and public. Moreover, these guarantees are not absolute. A defendant's right
to a public trial may be curtailed in order
to protect the psychological well-being of
victim witnesses. 117
Due process considerations of "fundamental fairness" 118 may be implicated if
the prosecution is granted advantages or
options it does not generally enjoy. 119 Due

process is satisfied, however, if the advantages are related to the need of protecting
child witnesses and facilitating the fact
finding process. Closed circuit testimony,
more so than videotape testimony, is live
testimony simultaneously shown in the
courtroom while the witness is testifying.

VII. Conclusion
Under Section 9-102, the testimony of a
child victim may be taken outside the
courtroom and the physical presence of
the defendant if the judge finds that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom
will result in the child suffering such serious emotional stress that the child could
not reasonably communicate. The Maryland statute narrowly limits the circumstances in which closed circuit testimony
may be used and preserves the critical elements of the trial setting. As the Supreme
Court has held, an adequate opportunity
for cross-examination may satisfy the confrontation clause even in the absence of
physical confrontation. The state's interest
in protecting young victims of child abuse
from further trauma and facilitating the
prosecution of their alleged assailants warrants dispensing with the defendant's faceto-face confrontation when the essential
elements of his or her confrontation rights
are satisfied.
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Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva

Gerant and Coddington then flew a 1966
Beechcraft from Ft. Lauderdale to South
Although the court's decision in Johnson
Carolina. There was circumstantial eviis in line with the majority of other state
dence suggesting that the Beechcraft carholdings, it is at odds with the slowly deried the ten kilograms of cocaine. Butler
veloping current trend. In fact, on May 31,
flew a 1969 Aerostar from Ft. Lauderdale
1985, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
to South Carolina with a passenger, Hanna.
All parties involved in the deal met at a
held that §44 of the Act allows an employee
Howard Johnson's and eventually all were
to hold his employer's insurer liable under
the theory of intentional infliction of emo- . arrested, with the exception of Coddington,
tional distress resulting from the actions of who escaped. In addition to recovering the
cocaine from an automobile, a search of
the insurer. Young v. Hartford Accident &
the hotel rooms revealed an electric money
Indemnity, 303 Md. 182, 492 A.2d 1270
counter, a microscope, several guns, $4,960
(1985); see also Gallagher v. Bituminous
in cash and a marijuana cigarette. A search
Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 303
of the Beechcraft revealed documents inMd. 201,492 A.2d 1280 (1985). Johnson
dicating that Gerant and Butler were on
seems to put an end to any further expandthe plane in the Bahamas three months
ing of the exclusive remedy exceptions unearlier.
der the Act. In Maryland, as in the majorUnder authority granted by 21 U.S.C.
ity of jurisdictions, without a showing of
§881 (b)(4), law enforcement officers seized
a "deliberate intention" to injure an emthe two airplanes once it was determined
ployee, an employer will not be held liable
they were used to promote the drug transoutside of the Act, no matter how grossly
action. Forfeiture proceedings against Tonegligent he might be. The end result in
tal Time Aircraft, Inc., the owner of the
Johnson was that Rodney Adams' estate,
Beechcraft, and Sundance Air, Inc., the
because Rodney had no dependents, could
owner of the Aerostar, were instituted in
only recover medical and funeral expenses.
federal district court. The consolidated
-Stephen A. Markey, III
cases were tried without a jury and the district court ruled both aircraft were subject
to forfeiture. Sundance Air is a Florida
corporation wholly owned by Gerant. The
district court determined that by transporting two drug conspirators, Gerant was
u.s. V. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft:
utilizing the corporation's plane to assist in
COURT UPHOLDS THIRD PARTY
the illegal act ofselling cocaine. Therefore,
FORFEITURE UNDER 21 U.S.C.
the Aerostar was used to "facilitate the
§881
sale, transportation, possession or concealment of cocaine" which the corporation
In U.S. v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft, 777
was aware of through its owner and was
F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1985), the United States
subject to forfeiture. Id. at 949.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit followed precedents from the Second, Fifth
Total Time, is also a Florida corporation
and Eleventh Circuits to hold that the use
owned by David and Virgil Seeright. Total
of an airplane to transport conspirators to
Time allowed Gerant touse the Beechcraft
on several occasions, including the trip to
the scene of a drug deal exposes that vehicle
South Carolina. The district court found
to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. §881 (1982).
that the Beechcraft transported the cocaine
The court further held that an airplane
on this particular trip, concluding that it
owned by an uninvolved third party was
was used to further the "sale, transportasubject to forfeiture because of his "conscious indifference." !d. at 952.
tion, possession or concealment" of cocaine
In early 1983, an informant in Greenville,
in violation of21 U.S.c. §881(a)(4). It further found that David Seeright, the corpoSouth Carolina contacted the Drug Enforceration's president, did not inquire into the
ment Agency (DEA) about a possible co"purpose of the trip, or what cargo would
caine sale. The informant was directed to
be carried, required no signed contract,
negotiate a buy and a DEA surveillance ophad no clear understanding as to when the
eration began. The informant arranged a
plane would be returned, and received no
deal with Brown and Montgomery to buy
money for its use." Id. at 950. In addition,
ten kilograms of cocaine for $500,000. In
a flight plan was not filed and there was no
late February, Montgomery flew to Ft.
insurance on the plane. The district court
Lauderdale, Florida to meet with Gerant
concluded that Total Time did nothing to
and Butler, the cocaine suppliers, and
guard against the illegal use of its plane,
Coddington, a middleman, to negotiate the
and therefore, was not an "innocent owner"
purcnase. After weighing the cocaine and
within the meaning of the Supreme Court's
checking its purity, Montgomery flew back
decision in Calero- Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
to Greenville.
continued from page 17
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